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WINTER 1964] COMMENTS 283
privacy as it has developed in the courts,"' but obligating the advertiser,
who uses another's name or photograph without authorization, by a
promise implied in law to compensate the party imposed upon for the
reasonable value of his services.52 Of course the damages will vary accord-
ing to the stature of the person involved and the way in which his name
or photograph is used. Such relief would be a reasonable protection of the
unwary against over-zealous entrepreneurs.
Nicholas C. Boz-i
DE FACTO SEGREGATION-THE ELUSIVE SPECTRE
OF BROWN
I.
INTRODUCTION
There is no virtue in sinning against light or in persisting in
palpable error, for nothing is settled until it is settled right.'
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court declared discrimination in
public education unconstitutional.2 This decision was a reflection of the
changing philosophy of our era expressed in a new approach to constitu-
tional rights. 3 Nine years after Brown v. Board of Educ., national recog-
51. See Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALg L.J. 1123,
1130 (1953), where it was stated:
In applying the right of privacy, courts have confused commercial interests
with privacy interests. The result of making one doctrine do the work of two
has been inadequate protection for both these interests in personality. The right
of privacy gives inadequate protection to the commercial interest in one's per-
sonality because courts have placed upon the right limitations which are appro-
priate only to the privacy interest.
52. This view was rejected in Birmingham Broadcasting Co. v. Bell, 259 Ala. 636,
68 So. 2d 314 (1953). The court, in denying plaintiff's claim in assumpsit, stated:
The only recognizable claim in respect to damages for the unauthorized use of one's
photograph for commercial purposes is that it violates his right of privacy.
1. Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commissioners, 188 N.C. 30,. 32, 123 S.E. 636, 638
(1924).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). See also Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753 (1955).; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954).
3. The change away from the "separate but equal" doctrine was gradual. In
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938), the Court
emphasized the need for real equality and rejected any attempt at mock equality.
It would not suffice for a state to provide a law school at home for whites and
mere fiscal aid to qualified Negroes to help them attend law schools in other states.
In Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948),
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nition is afforded the duty not to discriminate in public education. Both
positive and negative reactions to this duty have found their way into
print. 4 But whether a corresponding duty to integrate was imposed by
the Brown decision has not been settled. Legislatures and school boards
have been left in confusion, not knowing what they must, can, or cannot do.
The legal aspects of the states' role in implementing the Supreme Court's
mandate will be the subject of this comment.
II.
Is THERE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE? 5
There is no doubt that Brown v. Board of Educ. forbids the use of
governmental powers to enforce segregation,6 but one is left without clear
authority that declares whether the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment affirmatively commands integration. Both the courts7
and the legal commentators" have differed on this issue. Those authorities
who hold that there is no affirmative duty to integrate base their argument
on the negative wording of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
the Court maintained that qualified Negroes must be furnished the equivalent of legal
training within the state, if they are not admitted to the state law school. When
Negroes are admitted to a regular state university, they may not be segregated for
purposes of scholastic activity. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637,
70 S.Ct. 851 (1950). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950),
the requirement of real equality was stressed as far as to suggest that, at least in
professional education, nothing less than identical treatment would satisfy the Con-
stitution. The Court held that the Negro law school to which petitioner was admitted
excluded eighty-five per cent of the state's population including most of the state's
lawyers, witnesses, jurors and judges, and therefore the education was not substan-
tially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas
Law School.
4. For the positive reaction see, e.g., Fairman, The Attack on the Segregation
Cases. 70 HARv. L. Rgv. 83 (1956). Olney, Comment, A Government Lawyer Looks
at Little Rock, 45 CALIF. L. Rgv. 516 (1957). For the negative reaction see, e.g..
Byrnes, The Supreme Court Must Be Curbed, U.S. News & World Reports, May 18,
1956, p. 50; Ervin, The Case for Segregation, Look, April 3, 1956, p. 32. Southern
senators and representatives submitted separate identical "Manifestos," which declare
their interpretation of Constitutional principles. This so-called "Southern Manifesto"
is printed at 102 Cong. Rec. 4459, 4515 (March 12, 1956).
5. Integration as used in this comment is the attainment of a racial balance by
achieving a more equal attendance in schools located in areas where such inter-
relationship is possible. This does not necessitate a complete numerical balance, but
rather a more equal interracial mixture.
6. See, e.g.. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955); Avery v.
Wichita Falls Independent School District, 241 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938, 77 S.Ct. 816 (1957) ; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of
Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 378 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd on limited grounds, 358 U.S.
101, 79 S.Ct. 221 (1958) ; Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D. Del. 1962).
7. See, e.g., Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Evans v.
Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820, 823 (D. Del. 1962) (no duty to integrate). But see,
c.g.. Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); McCoy v.
Greensboro City Board of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960) (duty to integrate)
(by implication).
8. See, e.g., Avins, Book Review, 58 CoLuM. L. Rev. 428, 430-31 (1958), Com-
ment. 38 Ctri-KENT L. Rgv. 169 (1961) (no duty to integrate). But see, e.g., Maslow,
Dc Facto Public School Segregation, 6 Vrrr,. L. Rev. 353 (1961) (duty to integrate).
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in Delaware, in Evans v. Buchanan,9 one of many school segregation
cases, stated:
The court holds that the States do not have an affirmative, constitu-
tional duty to provide an integrated education. The pertinent portion
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads,
"nor [shall any State] deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." This clause does not contemplate com-
pelling action; rather, it is a prohibition preventing the States from
applying their laws unequally. 10
The Brown case was construed to prohibit only school segregation based
solely on race, and to indicate that there is no constitutional prohibition
against racial separation resulting from district boundaries based on non-
racial criteria" in the absence of "state action"'12 towards the perpetration
of segregation.
The advocates of the "no duty to integrate" position argue that
the Fourteenth Amendment must be applied universally without regard
to race, color or nationality. To command integration in the absence of
planned segregation would merely give a small minority special treatment1 3
in opposition to the neutrality of the Constitution. 14
Those who maintain that there exists an affirmative duty to integrate
ground their argument upon the theory that the state must provide equal
educational opportunities for all of its citizens, and upon the statement
in the Brown case that "separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal."' 15 They look to the fact of racial separation rather than to its cause,
and point to the resulting harm to Negro children who are deprived of
association with white achievement and cultural accomplishment.' 6 (They
can also argue that segregated white children are deprived of association
with Negro achievement and cultural accomplishment.) State legislatures
must now become "color-conscious,"' 7 recognizing that de facto segrega-
tion (the term used to categorize all-Negro or all-white schools that reflect
9. 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962).
10. Id. at 823.
11. Id. at 823-24.
12. See generally Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
REv. 3 (1961) ; Comment, 6 VILL. L. REv. 218 (1961).
13. Comment, supra note 8.
14. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
Rvv. 1 (1959).
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692 (1954).
16. See Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal
dismissed, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1961), 195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), stay denied, 82 S.Ct. 10 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
940, 82 S.Ct. 382 (1961). Here the New York court stated that twenty white children
in a school attended by four hundred and fifty four Negro children were not afforded
the educational and social contacts and interaction evisioned by Brown. It should be
noted that in the Taylor case the school board had originally gerrymandered the
school district boundaries to obtain segregation, although this policy of active segre-
gation had been dropped eleven years before the action commenced.
17. See LEVINE & MASLOW, FROM COLOR BLIND TO COLOR CONSCIOUS (1959),
cited in Maslow, supra note 8, at 359.
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the surrounding housing patterns) means inferior education for all con-
cerned. To draw school lines without considering the ethnic composition of
the resulting school districts is simply to allow the status quo to continue.
thereby perpetuating in many communities the discredited "separate but
equal" doctrine.'
Although the majority of courts and legal writers agree that there is
no duty to integrate under the Constitution, a number of cases showing a
trend towards affirmative integration have appeared. 9 Such cases find a
duty to integrate only by implication. They are not clear authority for
positive legislation in the area of integration.
A. The Presumption of Unconstitutionality
In spite of a holding that there was no duty to integrate, upon the
facts, the Delaware district court in Evans v. Buchanan20 still found that
the school board had discriminated in drawing school boundaries. The
court reasoned that the existence of a school with an all-Negro student body
and faculty, administered by a separate board, raised a presumption of
unconstitutionality of the pupil placement. The use of a presumption was
due to the onerous task of proving racial discrimination when the legis-
lature disavowed any discriminatory intention. Since the board had
superior access to the criteria used in determining district boundaries,
the court required it to overcome the presumption.2 1 A presumption may
affect only the burden of production, or it may also affect the burden of
persuasion.22 The Delaware district court held that the board had not come
forward with enough evidence to overcome the presumption. 23  If the
burden of persuasion is also shifted to the school boards, there is a possi-
18. Maslow, supra note 8, at 361.
19. Comment, 49 VA. L. Rnv. 367 (1963). The first significant step towards ani
affirmative duty to integrate was taken in Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 258
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958), which held that although the school districts were not
gerrymandered, they were still drawn on a racial basis due to a city ordinance which
enforced compulsory residential segregation. Accord, Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191
F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Previous gerrymandering of school lines was out-
lawed, although there was no present policy of active segregation. Branche v. Board
of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). On facts similar to those in the Taylor
case, but where there was no finding of any previous gerrymandering, the court held
the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment since they did not demonstrate
that there had not been segregation because of race. Similar to the preceding three
cases is McCoy v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960). There
Negroes attempted to enter an all white school; this school became all Negro in the
following year. The court held it unnecessary for plaintiffs to reapply for transfer
since "their desire to attend an integrated school was completely frustrated."
Id. at 669.
20. 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962). Nine Negro children petitioned to be
admitted to a desegregated school outside their designated school district. Their district
was all-Negro and much smaller than the all-white and predominately-white sur-
rounding districts. Petitioners argued that the school board must affirmatively inte-
grate and take into consideration racial factors when districts are drawn.
21. Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Del. 1962). The court also
found the facts of this case are "highly probative of the presumed fact."
22. Roberts, An Introduction to the Study of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. Rnv. 1.
15-29 (1958).
23. Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820, 825 & n.14 (D. Del. 1962). The school
board offered little evidence other than one witness who asserted that only facilities,
location and access roads were considered in drawing up the districting plan.
[VoL..9
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bility that a decision may be rendered against a defendant without any
showing of actual racial discrimination. 24 Shifting the burden of per-
suasion appears to be based on equitable principles and is used by the
courts to enforce the Brown decision when the facts warrant it. When the
Supreme Court has decided a vital constitutional issue, the federal courts
in following its mandate often disregard technicalities, which might be
used to avoid deciding the same issue if the case arose as one of first
impression, in order to reinforce the higher Court's decision.25 In effect,
the Evans case establishes an affirmative duty to integrate which may be
negated only by the positive showing that racial discrimination was not a
factor in drawing school boundaries.
III.
CAN THE STATE LEGISLATURES ACT To BRING ABOUT
A RACIAL BALANCE IN SCHOOLS?
De facto segregation presents an extremely complex problem for state
legislatures. The courts, in holding that there is no affirmative duty to
integrate, have left the state legislatures and their local school boards with
the problem of whether they can integrate public schools. The use of race
as a criterion to perpetuate segregation has been held unconstitutional.
In order to accomplish integration, it appears that the same criterion of
race must be used, which may still result in unequal treatment.
Until recently, the question of whether state governments can validly
encourage transfers of pupils and redistricting of schools on racial grounds
to achieve integration had not come before the courts. The issue arose
for the first time in Balaban v. Rubin.26 Due to the protests of Negro
parents, civic groups, and the New York Commission on Intergroup Rela-
tions,27 New York City adopted a policy of trying to achieve a racial
balance by means of reshaping school districts and transferring Negro
pupils from schools in their own neighborhood to schools in white neighbor-
hoods. 28 In Balaban, a group of white parents living in East Flatbush, a
predominantly white section of Brooklyn, brought a suit contesting the
redistricting of their neighborhood school boundary. Negro pupils had been
transported into East Flatbush schools by bus from other over-crowded
sections for several years. New York school authorities had built a new
junior high school, J.H.S. 275, in Brownsville, an adjacent section which
was heavily populated by Negro and Puerto Rican families. Had J.H.S.
275 not been built, the children of East Flatbush would have attended
24. 63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 546, 553 (1963). "If X [racial discrimination] is an in-
dispensable element of plaintiff's case, a presumption transferring the burden of per-
suasion of non-X to defendant permits the finder of fact, under some circumstances,
to render a verdict for plaintiff in the absence of proof of X and thereby may render X
inessential to a decision against defendant." Compare 15 STAN. L. Rev. 681 (1963).
25. McCoy v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960).
26. 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
27. Maslow, supra note 8, at 366.
28. Id. at 366-67. The transfer program in New York City is open to all races,
however, only students from over-crowded schools are permitted to transfer.
COMMENTS
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J.H.S. 285 which is located in their own neighborhood. The school zone
that was initially recommended for J.H.S. 275 had a racial and ethnic
composition of 52 per cent Negro, 34 per cent Puerto Rican, and 14 per
cent white students. 29 This zone was rejected by the school board on the
grounds that it was not centrally located, and that it would result in
undesirable de facto segregation if adopted. The district which was finally
adopted and later challenged created an enrollment of 35.2 per cent Negro,
33.5 per cent Puerto Rican and 31.2 per cent white students.
The plaintiffs contended that their children should go to J.H.S. 285
in East Flatbush. They charged that their children were barred from that
school because they were white. Justice Baker pointed out that "in the
ordinary course" these children would have attended their own neighbor-
hood school, J.H.S. 285.30 He found that the racial and ethnic balance
accomplished by the new boundary was the result of a fixed purpose to
bring white students into J.H.S. 275. 31 The judge held the assignment of
pupils violated the spirit and intent of a New York State law which said:
"No person shall be refused admission into or be excluded from any public
school in the state of New York on account of race, creed, color or national
origin. '32 He maintained that: "[I]t is unnecessary to consider whether
respondents' determination was based, in part, on factors other than racial
balance. Unquestionably, racial composition or balance was material to
the Board's determination, and is incapable of separation from the other
factors alleged to have been considered. '3 3 In effect, Justice Baker has
ruled there is no legal duty to integrate, nor is there a duty to encourage
reduced segregation, and furthermore, that it is a violation of New York
law even to consider race as a factor in school districting, reasoning that
once race is considered, it is always inseparable from the other factors.
Where does this leave the legislature and its school boards-in the position
of maintaining school boundaries regardless of the ethnic make-up of the
neighborhood. The Pasadena (California) Board of Education had also
taken a firm stand against any tampering with school zoning in declaring
that it would not allow "practices by parents which alter the faithful racial
representation of the geographical area served by each school. '34
The strict approach to redistricting of neighborhood schools in Pasa-
dena has been nullified by Jackson v. Pasadena City School District."",
In this case the board removed school A from the city's school system.
Students (all white) who lived in school zone A were reassigned to school
B which remained in the system. Plaintiff, a Negro student enrolled in
school C, alleged that the reassigned students more naturally belonged in
29. Balaban v. Rubin, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
30. Id. at 974.
31. Id. at 975.
32. N.Y. Etuc. LAW, § 3201.
33. Balaban v. Rubin, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
34. Superintendent's Bulletin No. 8, Pasadena City Schools, July 22, 1958, cited
in Maslow, supra note 8, at 364.
35. 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963).
[VOL. 9
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school C, but were put in B to establish C as a segregated school. Plaintiff
instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the school board to permit
him to transfer to school D, also in the system and unquestionably inte-
grated. The court pointed out that the school board has the power to exer-
cise reasonable discretion in establishing attendance zones within a district,
and could require students in a certain area to attend a given school.
However the board's powers are subject to the exercise of the consti-
tutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.36 The court held
that indirect state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment occurs where
school zoning is merely a subterfuge for producing or perpetuating racial
segregation in schools. 37 The fact that zone C was not changed in its
physical or racial composition was no indication that discrimination was
not practiced. Even in the absence of affirmative discriminatory conduct
by a school board, the court held a student would be entitled to relief
where, by reason of residential segregation, substantial racial imbalance
exists in his school. So long as large numbers of Negroes live in segre-
gated areas, the court continued, school boards will be faced with the problem
of giving Negroes the equal education they deserve. "Residential segre-
gation is in itself an evil which tends to frustrate the youth in the area and
to cause antisocial attitudes and behavior."38
The California court further declared that, when segregation in
schools exists, it is not enough to refrain from further affirmative discrimi-
natory conduct. The harmful influence on children due to racial imbalance
caused by geographically-based districts must be corrected. The court
called attention to the fact that the State Board of Education had adopted
regulations designed to avoid racial imbalance wherever possible: "It is
the declared policy of the State Board of Education that persons or
agencies responsible for the establishment of school attendance centers or
the assignment of pupils thereto shall exert all effort to avoid and eliminate
segregation of children on account of race or color."'3 9 The next section
of the California Administrative Code establishes race as a criterion for
setting up a racially-balanced school system wherever reasonably possible.40
36. Id. at 608, 382 P.2d at 880.
37. Id. at 609, 382 P.2d at 881.
38. Ibid.
39. CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 5, § 2010.
40. CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 5, § 2011, provides:
ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AREAS AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
PRACTICES IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS. For the purpose of avoiding, insofar as prac-
ticable, the establishment of attendance areas and attendance practices which in
practical effect discriminate upon an ethnic basis against pupils or their families
or which in practical effect tend to establish or maintain segregation on an ethnic
basis, the governing board of a school district in establishing attendance areas
and attendance practices in the district shall include among the factors considered
the following: (a) The ethnic composition of the residents in the immediate area
of the school. (b) The ethnic composition of the residents in the territory peri-
pheral to the immediate area of the school. (c) The effect on the ethnic composi-
tion of the student body of the school based upon alternate plans for establishing
the attendance area or attendance practice. (d) The effect on the ethnic com-
position of the student body of adjacent schools based upon alternate plans for
establishing an attendance area or an attendance practice. (e) The effect on the
COMMENTS
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California and New York have thus taken opposite views on the
problem of racial discrimination in public education. In so doing, they
represent the two major methods of attacking the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.41 New York has adopted the position
expounded by Mr. Justice Harlan in his now famous dissent in Plessy that
our Constitution is "color-blind" and that the regulation of all civil rights.
including segregation, based "solely upon the basis of race"42 is unconsti-
tutional. (Emphasis added.) California, on the other hand, seems to have
adopted the sociological and psychological basis for nondiscrimination upon
which the Brown decision rests,43 holding that "separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal, ' 44 and that encouraging the law's acceptance
of separate facilities adds to the inequality. California has adopted the
"color-conscious" view, affirmatively acting to end the vestiges of segrega-
tion by assuming the duty to integrate wherever possible.
A. The Neighborhood School System and Its Alternatives
The California and New York approaches to education rely upon the
neighborhood school system. Justice Baker, in effect, finds that each in-
dividual has the right to attend a school in his own chosen neighborhood 4 3-
a right based not on constitutional principles, but upon the American atti-
tude toward the neighborhood school. The neighborhood school is an
integral part of the community and a training ground for its leaders; its
elimination could therefore result in a breakdown of the community
social pattern.
Altering the neighborhood school system to eliminate de facto segre-
gation may place a burden upon the Negro children who may be forced
to compete with more advanced white students. It is feared that these
children will be overcome by a failure complex. However, if the efforts
to overcome de facto segregation are coupled with an assignment of special
personnel to aid the children (such as counselors, remedial mathematics
and reading teachers, and cultural enrichment teachers), the failure com-
plex can be overcome.
40
As basic as the neighborhood school system appears to be in the
traditional American approach to education, other methods may work just
as well. The "Princeton Plan" offers a relatively simple method of achiev-
ing a racial balance in areas where Negro and white schools are in close
proximity. Such a balance was achieved in Princeton, New Jersey, where
ethnic composition of the student body of the school and of adjacent schools on
the use of transportation presently necessary and provided either by a parent or
the district.
41. 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
42. Id. at 559, 16 S.Ct. at 1146.
43. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692 n.ll (1954).
44. Id. at 495, 74 S.Ct. at 692.
45. Balaban v. Rubin, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
46. Maslow, supra note 8, at 374-76. Students in an experimental project of a
de facto segregated school showed gains in all phases of their education when such
special personnel were added to the school.
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school authorities assigned all children in the first three grades to one
school in a Negro area and the other three grades to a second school out-
side the area. 47 Other school systems maintain a policy of allowing a child
to attend any school, provided that the school has room for him after
enrolling children from the neighborhood. However, this plan has not
brought about a racial balance in Philadelphia, perhaps because of the
general problem of over-crowded schools prevalent in most districts. 48
B. De Facto Segregation as a Violation of the "Equal Protection" Clause
If the neighborhood school is not guaranteed to the individual, either
constitutionally or by tradition, the state is free to adopt any plan. In
adopting a school system that results in segregation the state may deprive
the Negro of his constitutional right to equal protection of the law under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The boundaries of school zones are normally drawn along neighbor-
hood lines. Where racial imbalance exists it is usually caused by the fact
that the Negro population tends to concentrate in certain areas, primarily
because of economic factors and discriminatory housing practices.49 The
right to live wherever one wishes is fundamental, and if an individual
wishes to live in areas containing his own ethnic group, this right cannot
be challenged by the courts.
In the Civil Rights Cases5" the Supreme Court decided that the
Fourteenth Amendment placed no restrictions on the acts of private in-
dividuals. Negroes who had been denied access to threatres and inns
solely because of their race, petitioned the Court for redress. The Court
held the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 51 which made it a federal crime for the
owners of public conveyances, theatres, and other places of public amuse-
ment to deny anyone the full and equal enjoyment of their accommodations,
to be beyond the constitutional authority granted Congress by the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. From this landmark case, the doctrine
of "state action" evolved. The fundamental right to equality was protected
only from "state" interference, and not from "private" discriminatory
practices.
It was generally believed that judicial enforcement of private discrimi-
nation did not constitute state action.52 In 1948 the Supreme Court, in
Shelley v. Kraemer,5 3 held that the enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant by a state court was a violation of the equal protection clause of
47. Id. at 362.
48. Id. at 363. Only 5,000 out of 243,000 children attend schools outside their
home boundaries.
49. Weaver, Integration in Public and Private Housing, 304 ANNALS 86 (1956).
50. 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
51. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
52. See, e.g., Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1920);Queensborough Land Co. v. Cayeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915). But see
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
53. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the Court's logic, it would appear
that all state judicial enforcement of private discrimination would entail
"state action," resulting in the denial of equal protection. However, the
Court, as yet, refuses to expand the holding of Shelley beyond restrictive
covenants. 54 Despite this refusal, the case remains a potential weapon
against all forms of private discrimination.
The drawing of school boundaries along the lines of privately segre-
gated neighborhoods may be deemed an encouragement of such discrimina-
tion by the state since they reflect the existing racial segregation. These
boundaries would then be unenforceable by the courts as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The school board may, on the other hand, present
reasons for establishing boundaries along the lines of the segregated neigh-
borhoods unconnected with the issue of race. Factors such as proximity
to the school, the cost of transportation, avoidance of traffic hazards, and
the maximum utilization of all school space in the system may contribute
to the determination of boundaries. Does this mean that de facto segrega-
tion based on the neighborhood school system cannot be challenged if these
factors can be shown? This question may be answered by an examination
of the recent social trespass cases.55
C. The Social Trespass Cases
The Supreme Court has found state action in social trespass cases in
many varying and unique ways. It has expanded the concept of state
action 56 without relying on the logic of judicial enforcement expounded
in the Shelley decision. However, in so doing, the Court has come nearer
and nearer to adopting the Shelley rationale.57 In the case of Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority5 8 the state was held responsible for allow-
ing discrimination which, as a lessor, it could have prevented. The state
of Delaware was the owner of a restaurant which was constructed as part
of a complex of parking and other facilities. The restaurant had been
built by the state on public land partly with public funds and was then
leased to private individuals for operation. The lessee of the restaurant
refused to serve a Negro patron solely because of his race, and the Supreme
Court found sufficient "state action" to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Following the logic of the Burton case, it appears that there is
state action whenever the state could prevent discrimination for which
it has been in some way responsible. The state could prevent racial im-
54. See Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 226 (1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 947, 75 S.Ct. 875 (1955) (court enforced discriminatory provisions in a
will, held not state action) ; In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d
844 (1958), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts,
357 U.S. 570, 78 S.Ct. 1383 (1958) (court enforcement of discriminatory terms in
a trust not state action).
55. The term "social trespass" is used to describe racially discriminatory conduct
in public accommodations.
56. See generally Henkin, supra note 12; Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 12;
Comment, supra note 12.
57. 9 VIL. L. Rev. 129.
58. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961).
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balance in schools by redrawing boundaries, and the state is in some way
responsible for the imbalance since it has chosen to allow private discrimi-
nation in residential areas.
The Supreme Court avoided "state action" considerations in the first
two "sit-in" cases.59 In Boynton v. Virginia0 the Court held that a
passenger on an interstate trip has a federal right to be served by a
restaurant without discrimination. In Garner v. Louisiana6' the Court
held under similar circumstances that there was not sufficient evidence of
voluntary discrimination to convict the petitioners. However, in Peterson
v. City of Greenville6 2 the Court held the presence of a statute requiring
segregation in restaurant facilities created state action, no matter how
voluntary the private discrimination might be. Finally, in Lombard v.
Louisiana,6 3 though no legislative statute was present to enforce discrini-
nation, the Court found "state action" in speeches by the mayor and police
chief of New Orleans which directed continuance of segregated service
in private restaurants, and prohibited any conduct by either white or Negro
towards its discontinuance. The Court treated the two speeches as if they
were ordinances prohibiting integrated restaurants.
The Supreme Court has been drawing closer to the rationale ex-
pressed in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Lombard
case. He maintained that due to changes in our times, the courts, by
enforcing criminal statutes which foster segregation, "are denying some
people access to the mainstream of our highly interdependent life solely
because of their race,"'6 4 in violation of the principles expressed in the
Shelley case. Restaurants are only "nominally" private since they serve
the public. Moreover, state licensing and surveillance of such businesses
involves a service to the public and the owner rather than mere income-
producing activities. 65
Justice Douglas takes the position that the Fourteenth Amendment
keeps the "mainstream" of American life open to all. The principle of
Shelley prevents a private discrimination from being enforced by courts
when such discrimination reaches the level of blocking off part of the
"mainstream" solely because of race. Since the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the rights of the individual, it guarantees the rights of not only
the discriminated, but also the offending individual. In choosing whether
to enforce a private discrimination, the court must balance the rights of
these two opposing parties taking into consideration all factors which may
have led to the discriminatory conduct. Race may not be the sole reason
for discrimination.
59. "Sit-in" cases involved the conviction of petitioners under a criminal statute
for violating the private property rights of a restaurant owner.
60. 364 U.S. 454, 81 S.Ct. 182 (1960) ; 6 VILL. L. Rtv. 416 (1961).
61. 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248 (1961).
62. 83 S.Ct. 1119 (1963).
63. Id. at 1122.
64. Id. at 1128.
65. Id. at 1130.
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